SearcharxivSearch

arXiv · 2301.00637

Large-Scale Traffic Signal Control by a Nash Deep Q-network Approach

Abstract

Reinforcement Learning (RL) is currently one of the most commonly used techniques for traffic signal control (TSC), which can adaptively adjusted traffic signal phase and duration according to real-time traffic data. However, a fully centralized RL approach is beset with difficulties in a multi-network scenario because of exponential growth in state-action space with increasing intersections. Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) can overcome the high-dimension problem by employing the global control of each local RL agent, but it also brings new challenges, such as the failure of convergence caused by the non-stationary Markov Decision Process (MDP). In this paper, we introduce an off-policy nash deep Q-Network (OPNDQN) algorithm, which mitigates the weakness of both fully centralized and MARL approaches. The OPNDQN algorithm solves the problem that traditional algorithms cannot be used in large state-action space traffic models by utilizing a fictitious game approach at each iteration to find the nash equilibrium among neighboring intersections, from which no intersection has incentive to unilaterally deviate. One of main advantages of OPNDQN is to mitigate the non-stationarity of multi-agent Markov process because it considers the mutual influence among neighboring intersections by sharing their actions. On the other hand, for training a large traffic network, the convergence rate of OPNDQN is higher than that of existing MARL approaches because it does not incorporate all state information of each agent. We conduct an extensive experiments by using Simulation of Urban MObility simulator (SUMO), and show the dominant superiority of OPNDQN over several existing MARL approaches in terms of average queue length, episode training reward and average waiting time.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

BibTeXRIS

Yuli. Zhang, Shangbo. Wang, Ruiyuan. Jiang. 2023-01-02. Large-Scale Traffic Signal Control by a Nash Deep Q-network Approach. https://arxiv.org/abs/2301.00637

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

MMS Allocation for Chores with Online Agent Arrivals

We study the fair allocation of $m$ indivisible chores to $n$ agents with subadditive cost functions arriving online in an arbitrary order. Upon an agent's arrival, we are informed of her cost function and must irrevocably assign her a set of chores. We focus on the Maximin Share (MMS) fairness notion and aim to compute an allocation in which all items are assigned, and no agent incurs a cost more than $\alpha$ times her MMS. Without any prior information about the instance (other than $n$ and $m$), we design an algorithm with a competitive ratio of $O(\min\{n, k\log^{1+\epsilon}k, \log m\})$ for any constant $\epsilon > 0$, where $k$ denotes the number of cost function types. Our bound matches the best known offline approximation guarantees for MMS under subadditive costs and is nearly optimal with respect to all three parameters: we show that even for binary additive cost functions, no online algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio of $o(\min\{n, k\log k, \log m\})$. We then consider the setting in which the $k$ cost function types are known in advance (though the realized types of arriving agents are not). For additive cost functions, we provide an algorithm with a competitive ratio of $O(\min\{\log k, \log(kn)/\log\log(kn)\})$, and show that constant-competitive algorithms do not exist for general $k$, even for the binary additive setting. For binary additive functions when $k \le n$, we propose a $3$-competitive algorithm and establish a lower bound of $2$.

cs.GT

Truncated Noisy Best-Response Algorithms: Toward Game Theoretic Learning with Safety Guarantees

We consider a game theoretic approach to solve multi-agent coordination problems with submodular maximization objectives. It is known for such problems that the Nash equilibria for the corresponding game are always within 50% of the optimal, but that the equilibria which achieve this worst-case bound are not stable. To exploit this instability, we propose a family of algorithms which we call Truncated Noisy Best-Response (TNBR) Algorithms. These algorithms are flexibly characterized by agents asynchronously and stochastically selecting actions from a neighbourhood of their best response payoffs. We compute bounds on the recurrent classes of TNBR algorithms' associated Markov chains. Our bounds fall into two categories: first, "Performance" bounds ensure that TNBR algorithms always have a high-value recurrent state; second, "Safety" bounds ensure that TNBR algorithms never have arbitrarily-bad recurrent states. Furthermore, these two types of bounds are linked by a waterbed-like effect: every game with a poor Safety guarantee necessarily has a favorable Performance guarantee.

cs.GT

Existence of the Core in Approval-Based Committee Elections

We settle the main open question in the theory of approval-based multi-winner elections: we show that there always exists a committee in the core. The core is a stability and group fairness concept. The proof introduces a new voting rule that optimizes an entropy-like objective function over committees and payment systems. All local optima of this objective function lie in the core, which implies that a core committee can be found in polynomial time.

cs.GT