Implicit Commitment in a General Setting

Mateusz Łelyk; Carlo Nicolai

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arXiv · 2302.02783

Implicit Commitment in a General Setting

Mateusz Łelyk·Carlo Nicolai

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Abstract

G\"odel's Incompleteness Theorems suggest that no single formal system can capture the entirety of one's mathematical beliefs, while pointing at a hierarchy of systems of increasing logical strength that make progressively more explicit those \emph{implicit} assumptions. This notion of \emph{implicit commitment} motivates directly or indirectly several research programmes in logic and the foundations of mathematics; yet there hasn't been a direct logical analysis of the notion of implicit commitment itself. In a recent paper, \L elyk and Nicolai carried out an initial assessment of this project by studying necessary conditions for implicit commitments; from seemingly weak assumptions on implicit commitments of an arithmetical system $S$, it can be derived that a uniform reflection principle for $S$ -- stating that all numerical instances of theorems of $S$ are true -- must be contained in $S$'s implicit commitments. This study gave rise to unexplored research avenues and open questions. This paper addresses the main ones. We generalize this basic framework for implicit commitments along two dimensions: in terms of iterations of the basic implicit commitment operator, and via a study of implicit commitments of theories in arbitrary first-order languages, not only couched in an arithmetical language.

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Mateusz Łelyk, Carlo Nicolai. 2023-02-06. Implicit Commitment in a General Setting. https://arxiv.org/abs/2302.02783

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