arXiv · 2302.12125
The Hidden Shortcomings of (D)AOs -- An Empirical Study of On-Chain Governance
Abstract
Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) are a recent innovation in organizational structures, which are already widely used in the blockchain ecosystem. We empirically study the on-chain governance systems of 21 DAOs and open source the live dataset. The DAOs we study are of various size and activity, and govern a wide range of protocols and services, such as decentralized exchanges, lending protocols, infrastructure projects and common goods funding. Our analysis unveils a high concentration of voting rights, a significant hidden monetary costs of on-chain governance systems, as well as a remarkably high amount of pointless governance activity.
Explore related subjects
Keep this discovery
Rainer Feichtinger, Robin Fritsch, Yann Vonlanthen, Roger Wattenhofer. 2023-02-23. The Hidden Shortcomings of (D)AOs -- An Empirical Study of On-Chain Governance. https://arxiv.org/abs/2302.12125
Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.