arXiv · 2303.17790
A Study of an Atomic Mobility Game With Uncertainty Under Prospect Theory
Abstract
In this paper, we present a study of a mobility game with uncertainty in the decision-making of travelers and incorporate prospect theory to model travel behavior. We formulate a mobility game that models how travelers distribute their traffic flows in a transportation network with splittable traffic, utilizing the Bureau of Public Roads function to establish the relationship between traffic flow and travel time cost. Given the inherent non-linearities and complexity introduced by the uncertainties, we propose a smooth approximation function to estimate the prospect-theoretic cost functions. As part of our analysis, we characterize the best-fit parameters and derive an upper bound for the error. We then show the existence of an equilibrium and its its best-possible approximation.
Explore related subjects
Keep this discovery
Ioannis Vasileios Chremos, Heeseung Bang, Aditya Dave, Viet-Anh Le, Andreas A. Malikopoulos. 2023-03-31. A Study of an Atomic Mobility Game With Uncertainty Under Prospect Theory. https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.17790
Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.