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arXiv · 2304.11518

Breaking the general election effect. The impact of the 2020 US presidential election on Chinese economy and counter strategies

Junjie Zhao
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Abstract

The study of US-China relations has always been a crucial topic in our economic development [4][5][7], and the US presidential election plays an integral role in shaping these relations. The presidential election is held every four years, and it is crucial to assess the impact of the 2020 election on China to prepare for the potential effects of the 2024 US presidential election on the Chinese economy [8][16][20]. To achieve this, we have gathered statistical data from nearly 70 years and analyzed data related to the US economy. We have classified the collected data and utilized the analytic hierarchy process [1][2][3] to evaluate the President's policy implementation.This approach allowed us to obtain a comprehensive ranking of the indicators [6][9][11][33]. We then quantified the index data and employed the entropy weight method to calculate the weight of each index data. Finally, we used the weighted total score calculation to evaluate the economic status of the United States in a hierarchical manner after the election of Presidents Trump and Biden [15][18]. We optimized the index system by incorporating additional dimension indexes such as "foreign policy". We then crawled China's specific development data from 1990-2020 and substituted it into the model for analysis and evaluation. This enabled us to obtain detailed quantitative index data of the degree of influence [10][12][14]. To address China's shortcomings in science and technology innovation, we recommend strengthening economic cooperation with developed countries, diversifying market development, and actively expanding the domestic market through feasible solutions [13][16][23][36].

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Junjie Zhao. 2023-04-23. Breaking the general election effect. The impact of the 2020 US presidential election on Chinese economy and counter strategies. https://arxiv.org/abs/2304.11518

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