The Importance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Combinatorial Bayesian Settings

Tomer Ezra; Tamar Garbuz

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arXiv · 2307.02610

The Importance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Combinatorial Bayesian Settings

Tomer Ezra·Tamar Garbuz

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Abstract

We study the measure of order-competitive ratio introduced by Ezra et al. [2023] for online algorithms in Bayesian combinatorial settings. In our setting, a decision-maker observes a sequence of elements that are associated with stochastic rewards that are drawn from known priors, but revealed one by one in an online fashion. The decision-maker needs to decide upon the arrival of each element whether to select it or discard it (according to some feasibility constraint), and receives the associated rewards of the selected elements. The order-competitive ratio is defined as the worst-case ratio (over all distribution sequences) between the performance of the best order-unaware and order-aware algorithms, and quantifies the loss incurred due to the lack of knowledge of the arrival order. Ezra et al. [2023] showed how to design algorithms that achieve better approximations with respect to the new benchmark (order-competitive ratio) in the single-choice setting, which raises the natural question of whether the same can be achieved in combinatorial settings. In particular, whether it is possible to achieve a constant approximation with respect to the best online algorithm for downward-closed feasibility constraints, whether $\omega(1/n)$-approximation is achievable for general (non-downward-closed) feasibility constraints, or whether a convergence rate to $1$ of $o(1/\sqrt{k})$ is achievable for the multi-unit setting. We show, by devising novel constructions that may be of independent interest, that for all three scenarios, the asymptotic lower bounds with respect to the old benchmark, also hold with respect to the new benchmark.

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Tomer Ezra, Tamar Garbuz. 2023-07-05. The Importance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Combinatorial Bayesian Settings. https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.02610

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