arXiv · 2307.04222
Derandomizing Codes for the Binary Adversarial Wiretap Channel of Type II
Abstract
We revisit the binary adversarial wiretap channel (AWTC) of type II in which an active adversary can read a fraction $r$ and flip a fraction $p$ of codeword bits. The semantic-secrecy capacity of the AWTC II is partially known, where the best-known lower bound is non-constructive, proven via a random coding argument that uses a large number (that is exponential in blocklength $n$) of random bits to seed the random code. In this paper, we establish a new derandomization result in which we match the best-known lower bound of $1-H_2(p)-r$ where $H_2(\cdot)$ is the binary entropy function via a random code that uses a small seed of only $O(n^2)$ bits. Our random code construction is a novel application of pseudolinear codes -- a class of non-linear codes that have $k$-wise independent codewords when picked at random where $k$ is a design parameter. As the key technical tool in our analysis, we provide a soft-covering lemma in the flavor of Goldfeld, Cuff and Permuter (Trans. Inf. Theory 2016) that holds for random codes with $k$-wise independent codewords.
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Eric Ruzomberka, Homa Nikbakht, Christopher G. Brinton, David J. Love, H. Vincent Poor. 2023-07-09. Derandomizing Codes for the Binary Adversarial Wiretap Channel of Type II. https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.04222
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