arXiv · 2307.05511
Opinions with few disciples can win in the dynamical directed networks: an evolutionary game perspective
Abstract
The voter model on networks is crucial to understand opinion formation. Uni-directional social interactions are ubiquitous in real social networks whereas undirected interactions are intensively studied. We establish a voter model on a dynamical directed network. We show that the opinion invasion is captured by a replicator equation of an emergent four-player two-strategy game, and the average in(out)-degree for the two opinions is fully captured by an emergent three-player two-strategy game. Interestingly, it is shown that the difference between the two emergent games arises from the uni-directionality of the network. The difference implies that the opinion with a small number of disciples can take over the population for in-group bias, provided that the network is directed. Our work makes an explicit connection between opinion dynamics and evolutionary games.
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Yakun Wang, Bin Wu. 2023-07-05. Opinions with few disciples can win in the dynamical directed networks: an evolutionary game perspective. https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.05511
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