arXiv · 2308.15312
Longest-chain Attacks: Difficulty Adjustment and Timestamp Verifiability
Abstract
We study an adversary who attacks a Proof-of-Work (POW) blockchain by selfishly constructing an alternative longest chain. We characterize optimal strategies employed by the adversary when a difficulty adjustment rule al\`a Bitcoin applies. As time (namely the times-tamp specified in each block) in most permissionless POW blockchains is somewhat subjective, we focus on two extreme scenarios: when time is completely verifiable, and when it is completely unverifiable. We conclude that an adversary who faces a difficulty adjustment rule will find a longest-chain attack very challenging when timestamps are verifiable. POW blockchains with frequent difficulty adjustments relative to time reporting flexibility will be substantially more vulnerable to longest-chain attacks. Our main fining provides guidance on the design of difficulty adjustment rules and demonstrates the importance of timestamp verifiability.
Explore related subjects
Keep this discovery
Tzuo Hann Law, Selman Erol, Lewis Tseng. 2023-08-29. Longest-chain Attacks: Difficulty Adjustment and Timestamp Verifiability. https://arxiv.org/abs/2308.15312
Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.