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arXiv · 2309.00251

Optimal Repair Strategy Against Advanced Persistent Threats Under Time-Varying Networks

Abstract

Advanced persistent threat (APT) is a kind of stealthy, sophisticated, and long-term cyberattack that has brought severe financial losses and critical infrastructure damages. Existing works mainly focus on APT defense under stable network topologies, while the problem under time-varying dynamic networks (e.g., vehicular networks) remains unexplored, which motivates our work. Besides, the spatiotemporal dynamics in defense resources, complex attackers' lateral movement behaviors, and lack of timely defense make APT defense a challenging issue under time-varying networks. In this paper, we propose a novel game-theoretical APT defense approach to promote real-time and optimal defense strategy-making under both periodic time-varying and general time-varying environments. Specifically, we first model the interactions between attackers and defenders in an APT process as a dynamic APT repair game, and then formulate the APT damage minimization problem as the precise prevention and control (PPAC) problem. To derive the optimal defense strategy under both latency and defense resource constraints, we further devise an online optimal control-based mechanism integrated with two backtracking-forward algorithms to fastly derive the near-optimal solution of the PPAC problem in real time. Extensive experiments are carried out, and the results demonstrate that our proposed scheme can efficiently obtain optimal defense strategy in 54481 ms under seven attack-defense interactions with 9.64$\%$ resource occupancy in stimulated periodic time-varying and general time-varying networks. Besides, even under static networks, our proposed scheme still outperforms existing representative APT defense approaches in terms of service stability and defense resource utilization.

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BibTeXRIS

Zixuan Wang, Jiliang Li, Yuntao Wang, Zhou Su, Shui Yu, Weizhi Meng. 2023-09-01. Optimal Repair Strategy Against Advanced Persistent Threats Under Time-Varying Networks. https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.00251

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