SearcharxivSearch

arXiv · 2309.02608

The Iberian Exception: An overview of its effects over its first 100 days

Abstract

This paper offers an independent assessment of certain key economic effects of the Iberian Exception (IE). Their stated aim was to reduce the major component of electricity prices for most Iberian consumers, a component which was indexed to Iberian wholesale power market spot prices power market prices that were rising alarmingly due to extremely tight international markets for natural gas. The Spanish Government estimates that, during its first 100 days, the IE provided substantial benefits for consumers affected by the IE, which included over 10 million small consumers as well as many large ones, but the authors of this study question that estimate. The authors of this paper argue that the estimated effect of the IE on retail prices depends critically on the assumptions about what would have occurred in the absence of the IE, i.e., in a counterfactual scenario. Although counterfactuals are always difficult to construct, the government s counterfactual ignores demand elasticity, and this inflates their estimate of immediate consumer benefits. Using hourly data on the wholesale electricity market for the first 100 days of the IE, this paper s analysis of alternative counterfactuals that reflect the effects of demand elasticity shows substantially lower benefits of the IE for consumers than the Spanish government estimates. Indeed, this paper s analysis suggests that affected consumers would have paid somewhat less for electricity in the first 100 days of the IE had it not been introduced. The authors identify several other potential short and longterm effects of the IE that deserve further study. These include increased margins for fossil fired generators, reduced margins for some decarbonized inframarginal plant, heightened investor perceptions of regulatory risk, weakened incentives for efficient consumption, and higher carbon emissions and gas prices.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

BibTeXRIS

David Robinson, Angel Arcos-Vargas, Micheael Tennican, Fernando Núñez. 2023-09-05. The Iberian Exception: An overview of its effects over its first 100 days. https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.02608

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

Reducing Prescription Errors Through Information Intervention: A Field Experiment in Healthcare Operations

Drug-drug interaction (DDI) errors pose serious risks to patient safety. Existing decision-support systems often require physicians to respond to alerts, disrupting workflows and contributing to high override rates. We examine whether a non-mandatory information intervention can reduce DDI errors and foster learning. Using a randomized field experiment with India's largest electronic medical record platform, we analyze 2.81 million prescriptions from 1,700 physicians using a difference-in-differences design. Treatment physicians received real-time information highlighting DDI errors without being required to respond, while control physicians received no such information. The intervention reduced DDI errors by 8.6%, corresponding to an estimated US$4.8 million in annual hospitalization cost savings and approximately 134 lives potentially saved. We identify two mechanisms: reactive correction, whereby physicians remove errors after they are flagged, and proactive learning, whereby they avoid errors before alerts occur. While early reductions are driven primarily by correction, physicians increasingly avoid errors over time. They also become less likely to repeat previously flagged errors and reduce new errors, suggesting that learning generalizes beyond specific drug pairs. The effects are consistent across physician types and do not compromise productivity or care quality. Our findings show that non-mandatory information interventions can improve patient safety through both immediate error correction and persistent, generalizable learning.

econ.GN

How an Economy Shrinks in Space: Concavity-on-Jobs and Upward Consolidation under Demographic Decline

When a country's population declines, the aggregate economy appears to contract on the intensive margin: industrial diversity intact, every industry a little smaller. At the regional level, contraction is uneven and takes the extensive form: entire industries disappear, one after another. The relevant unit is the city: industries are nested by size - the hierarchy property of industrial location - each viable only above a minimum population. Necessity industries' thresholds bunch at the low end, so a city's industry count - and its jobs - is sharply concave in size (concavity on jobs). A modest loss pushes a small city below many thresholds at once; a large core sheds a few specialized industries, one at a time. Lost industries consolidate upward to the next city large enough to host them; for the worker it means a step down to a lower-paid local job. To recover that income, workers move up to the apex - the only city hosting the full industry range. Studying Japan - two decades ahead of the OECD, Tokyo at its apex - with worker-level panel data on the young workers who carry the migration, a wage regression in real, housing-inclusive wages identifies a Tokyo-bound migration incentive that varies by origin, following concavity on jobs.

econ.GN

Do wind and solar curtail at negative electricity prices? Incentives and evidence across two decades of German renewable support schemes

In many power systems, wind and solar generation increasingly often exceeds electricity demand. Curtailing renewable generation in those hours matters both for prices and for the physical stability of the grid. Turning off wind turbines and solar panels is technically easier than ramping down a large power station, yet support schemes often give renewables an economic incentive to keep producing at negative prices. This paper studies wind and solar energy in Germany. For each cohort of generators it estimates, hour by hour, the incentive implied by two decades of support policy. It then sets those incentives against observed behavior, using a new estimate of market-based curtailment built from reanalysis weather data. I find that in 2025, at prices below -50 EUR/MWh, almost all wind generators had an incentive to stop producing, but only half of them did. Solar is the opposite case: nearly two thirds of the potential had no incentive to curtail at all, mostly because it receives a feed-in tariff that shields it from wholesale prices. Of the exposed remainder, just over a fifth cut production. Low exposure and response rates inflate subsidy payments and make the power system harder to operate safely. I conclude that a further expansion of wind and solar requires them to respond to price signals.

econ.GN