arXiv · 2310.17046
Proving the Absence of Microarchitectural Timing Channels
Abstract
Microarchitectural timing channels are a major threat to computer security. A set of OS mechanisms called time protection was recently proposed as a principled way of preventing information leakage through such channels and prototyped in the seL4 microkernel. We formalise time protection and the underlying hardware mechanisms in a way that allows linking them to the information-flow proofs that showed the absence of storage channels in seL4.
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Scott Buckley, Robert Sison, Nils Wistoff, Curtis Millar, Toby Murray, Gerwin Klein, Gernot Heiser. 2023-10-25. Proving the Absence of Microarchitectural Timing Channels. https://arxiv.org/abs/2310.17046
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