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arXiv · 2402.03975

Smoothed analysis of deterministic discounted and mean-payoff games

Bruno Loff·Mateusz Skomra
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Abstract

We devise a policy-iteration algorithm for deterministic two-player discounted and mean-payoff games, that runs in polynomial time with high probability, on any input where each payoff is chosen independently from a sufficiently random distribution. This includes the case where an arbitrary set of payoffs has been perturbed by a Gaussian, showing for the first time that deterministic two-player games can be solved efficiently, in the sense of smoothed analysis. More generally, we devise a condition number for deterministic discounted and mean-payoff games, and show that our algorithm runs in time polynomial in this condition number. Our result confirms a previous conjecture of Boros et al., which was claimed as a theorem and later retracted. It stands in contrast with a recent counter-example by Christ and Yannakakis, showing that Howard's policy-iteration algorithm does not run in smoothed polynomial time on stochastic single-player mean-payoff games. Our approach is inspired by the analysis of random optimal assignment instances by Frieze and Sorkin, and the analysis of bias-induced policies for mean-payoff games by Akian, Gaubert and Hochart.

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Bruno Loff, Mateusz Skomra. 2024-02-06. Smoothed analysis of deterministic discounted and mean-payoff games. https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.03975

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