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arXiv · 2403.09991

DDPS: Dynamic Differential Pricing-based Edge Offloading System with Energy Harvesting Devices

Hai Xue·Yun Xia·Neal N. Xiong·Di Zhang·Songwen Pei
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Abstract

Mobile edge computing (MEC) paves the way to alleviate the burden of energy and computation of mobile users (MUs) by offloading tasks to the network edge. To enhance the MEC server utilization by optimizing its resource allocation, a well-designed pricing strategy is indispensable. In this paper, we consider the edge offloading scenario with energy harvesting devices, and propose a dynamic differential pricing system (DDPS), which determines the price per unit time according to the usage of computing resources to improve the edge server utilization. Firstly, we propose an offloading decision algorithm to decide whether to conduct the offloading operation and how much data to be offloaded if conducted, the algorithm determines offloading operation by balancing the energy harvested with the energy consumed. Secondly, for the offloading case, we formulate the game between the MUs and the server as a Stackelberg game, and propose a differential pricing algorithm to determine the optimal computing resources required by MUs. Furthermore, the proposed algorithm also reallocates computing resources for delay-sensitive devices while server resources are surplus after the initial allocation, aiming to make full use of the server computing resources. Extensive simulations are conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed DDPS scheme.

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Hai Xue, Yun Xia, Neal N. Xiong, Di Zhang, Songwen Pei. 2024-03-15. DDPS: Dynamic Differential Pricing-based Edge Offloading System with Energy Harvesting Devices. https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.09991

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