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arXiv · 2403.13296

Private Aggregate Queries to Untrusted Databases

Syed Mahbub Hafiz·Chitrabhanu Gupta·Warren Wnuck·Brijesh Vora·Chen-Nee Chuah
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Abstract

Private information retrieval (PIR), a privacy-preserving cryptographic tool, solves a simplified version of this problem by hiding the database item that a client accesses. Most PIR protocols require the client to know the exact row index of the intended database item, which cannot support the complicated aggregation-based statistical query in a similar setting. Some works in the PIR space contain keyword searching and SQL-like queries, but most need multiple interactions between the PIR client and PIR servers. Some schemes support searching SQL-like expressive queries in a single round but fail to enable aggregate queries. These schemes are the main focus of this paper. To bridge the gap, we have built a general-purpose novel information-theoretic PIR (IT-PIR) framework that permits a user to fetch the aggregated result, hiding all sensitive sections of the complex query from the hosting PIR server in a single round of interaction. In other words, the server will not know which records contribute to the aggregation. We then evaluate the feasibility of our protocol for both benchmarking and real-world application settings. For instance, in a complex aggregate query to the Twitter microblogging database of 1 million tweets, our protocol takes 0.014 seconds for a PIR server to generate the result when the user is interested in one of 3K user handles. In contrast, for a much-simplified task, not an aggregate but a positional query, Goldberg's regular IT-PIR (Oakland 2007) takes 1.13 seconds. For all possible user handles, 300K, it takes equal time compared to the regular IT-PIR. This example shows that complicated aggregate queries through our framework do not incur additional overhead if not less, compared to the conventional query.

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Syed Mahbub Hafiz, Chitrabhanu Gupta, Warren Wnuck, Brijesh Vora, Chen-Nee Chuah. 2024-03-20. Private Aggregate Queries to Untrusted Databases. https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.13296

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