arXiv · 2403.16232
Mean Field Game of Mutual Holding with common noise
Abstract
We consider the mean field game of cross--holding introduced in \citeauthor*{DjeteTouzi} \cite{DjeteTouzi} in the context where the equity value dynamics are affected by a common noise. In contrast with \cite{DjeteTouzi}, the problem exhibits the standard paradigm of mean--variance trade off. Our crucial observation is to search for equilibrium solutions of our mean field game among those models which satisfy an appropriate notion of no--arbitrage. Under this condition, it follows that the representative agent optimization step is reduced to a standard portfolio optimization problem with random endowment.
Explore related subjects
Keep this discovery
Leila Bassou, Mao Fabrice Djete, Nizar Touzi. 2024-03-24. Mean Field Game of Mutual Holding with common noise. https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.16232
Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.