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arXiv · 2404.19683

Collaborative Control Method of Transit Signal Priority Based on Cooperative Game and Reinforcement Learning

Abstract

To address the low efficiency in priority signal control within intelligent transportation systems, this study introduces a novel eight-phase priority signal control method, CBQL-TSP, leveraging a hybrid decision-making framework that integrates cooperative game theory and reinforcement learning. This approach conceptualizes the allocation of bus signal priorities as a multi-objective decision-making problem across an eight-phase signal sequence, differentiating between priority and non-priority phases. It employs a cooperative game model to facilitate this differentiation. The developed hybrid decision-making algorithm, CBQL, effectively tackles the multi-objective decision-making challenges inherent in the eight-phase signal sequence. By computing the Shapley value function, it quantifies the marginal contributions of each participant, which in turn inform the construction of a state transition probability equation based on Shapley value ratios. Compared to conventional control methods, the CBQL-TSP method not only upholds the fairness principles of cooperative game theory but also harnesses the adaptive learning capabilities of Q-Learning. This enables dynamic adjustments to signal timing in response to real-time traffic conditions, significantly enhancing the flexibility and efficiency of priority signal control.

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BibTeXRIS

Hao Qin, Weishi Zhang. 2024-04-30. Collaborative Control Method of Transit Signal Priority Based on Cooperative Game and Reinforcement Learning. https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.19683

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