SearcharxivSearch

arXiv · 2406.17767

Splitting Guarantees for Prophet Inequalities via Nonlinear Systems

Abstract

The prophet inequality is one of the cornerstone problems in optimal stopping theory and has become a crucial tool for designing sequential algorithms in Bayesian settings. In the i.i.d. $k$-selection prophet inequality problem, we sequentially observe $n$ non-negative random values sampled from a known distribution. Each time, a decision is made to accept or reject the value, and under the constraint of accepting at most $k$. For $k=1$, Hill and Kertz [Ann. Probab. 1982] provided an upper bound on the worst-case approximation ratio that was later matched by an algorithm of Correa et al. [Math. Oper. Res. 2021]. The worst-case tight approximation ratio for $k=1$ is computed by studying a differential equation that naturally appears when analyzing the optimal dynamic programming policy. A similar result for $k>1$ has remained elusive. In this work, we introduce a nonlinear system of differential equations for the i.i.d. $k$-selection prophet inequality that generalizes Hill and Kertz's equation when $k=1$. Our nonlinear system is defined by $k$ constants that determine its functional structure, and their summation provides a lower bound on the optimal policy's asymptotic approximation ratio for the i.i.d. $k$-selection prophet inequality. To obtain this result, we introduce for every $k$ an infinite-dimensional linear programming formulation that fully characterizes the worst-case tight approximation ratio of the $k$-selection prophet inequality problem for every $n$, and then we follow a dual-fitting approach to link with our nonlinear system for sufficiently large values of $n$. As a corollary, we use our provable lower bounds to establish a tight approximation ratio for the stochastic sequential assignment problem in the i.i.d. non-negative regime.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

Johannes Brustle, Sebastian Perez-Salazar, Victor Verdugo. 2024-06-25. Splitting Guarantees for Prophet Inequalities via Nonlinear Systems. https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.17767

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

MMS Allocation for Chores with Online Agent Arrivals

We study the fair allocation of $m$ indivisible chores to $n$ agents with subadditive cost functions arriving online in an arbitrary order. Upon an agent's arrival, we are informed of her cost function and must irrevocably assign her a set of chores. We focus on the Maximin Share (MMS) fairness notion and aim to compute an allocation in which all items are assigned, and no agent incurs a cost more than $\alpha$ times her MMS. Without any prior information about the instance (other than $n$ and $m$), we design an algorithm with a competitive ratio of $O(\min\{n, k\log^{1+\epsilon}k, \log m\})$ for any constant $\epsilon > 0$, where $k$ denotes the number of cost function types. Our bound matches the best known offline approximation guarantees for MMS under subadditive costs and is nearly optimal with respect to all three parameters: we show that even for binary additive cost functions, no online algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio of $o(\min\{n, k\log k, \log m\})$. We then consider the setting in which the $k$ cost function types are known in advance (though the realized types of arriving agents are not). For additive cost functions, we provide an algorithm with a competitive ratio of $O(\min\{\log k, \log(kn)/\log\log(kn)\})$, and show that constant-competitive algorithms do not exist for general $k$, even for the binary additive setting. For binary additive functions when $k \le n$, we propose a $3$-competitive algorithm and establish a lower bound of $2$.

cs.GT

Truncated Noisy Best-Response Algorithms: Toward Game Theoretic Learning with Safety Guarantees

We consider a game theoretic approach to solve multi-agent coordination problems with submodular maximization objectives. It is known for such problems that the Nash equilibria for the corresponding game are always within 50% of the optimal, but that the equilibria which achieve this worst-case bound are not stable. To exploit this instability, we propose a family of algorithms which we call Truncated Noisy Best-Response (TNBR) Algorithms. These algorithms are flexibly characterized by agents asynchronously and stochastically selecting actions from a neighbourhood of their best response payoffs. We compute bounds on the recurrent classes of TNBR algorithms' associated Markov chains. Our bounds fall into two categories: first, "Performance" bounds ensure that TNBR algorithms always have a high-value recurrent state; second, "Safety" bounds ensure that TNBR algorithms never have arbitrarily-bad recurrent states. Furthermore, these two types of bounds are linked by a waterbed-like effect: every game with a poor Safety guarantee necessarily has a favorable Performance guarantee.

cs.GT

Existence of the Core in Approval-Based Committee Elections

We settle the main open question in the theory of approval-based multi-winner elections: we show that there always exists a committee in the core. The core is a stability and group fairness concept. The proof introduces a new voting rule that optimizes an entropy-like objective function over committees and payment systems. All local optima of this objective function lie in the core, which implies that a core committee can be found in polynomial time.

cs.GT