arXiv · 2408.00733
Optimal Control and Potential Games in the Mean Field
Abstract
We study a mean field optimal control problem with general non-Markovian dynamics, including both common noise and jumps. We show that its minimizers are Nash equilibria of an associated mean field game of controls. These types of games are necessarily potential, and the Nash equilibria derived as the minimizers of the control problem are closely connected to McKean-Vlasov equations of Langevin type. To illustrate the general theory, we present several examples, including a mean field game of controls with interactions through a price variable, and mean field Cucker-Smale Flocking and Kuramoto models. We also establish the invariance property of the value function, a key ingredient used in our proofs.
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Felix Höfer, H. Mete Soner. 2024-08-01. Optimal Control and Potential Games in the Mean Field. https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.00733
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