arXiv · 2410.01830
Separating minimal from radical embodied cognitive neuroscience
Abstract
Mougenot and Matheson (2024) make a compelling case for the development of a mechanistic cognitive neuroscience that is embodied. However, their analysis of extant work under this header plays down important distinctions between "minimal" and "radical" embodiment. The former remains firmly neurocentric and therefore has limited potential to move the needle in understanding the functional contributions of neural dynamics to cognition in the context of wider organism-environment dynamics.
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Matthieu M. de Wit. 2024-09-17. Separating minimal from radical embodied cognitive neuroscience. https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.01830
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