Optimal Communication and Key Rate Region for Hierarchical Secure Aggregation with User Collusion

Abstract

Secure aggregation is concerned with the task of securely uploading the inputs of multiple users to an aggregation server without letting the server know the inputs beyond their summation. It finds broad applications in distributed machine learning paradigms such as federated learning (FL) where multiple clients, each having access to a proprietary dataset, periodically upload their locally trained models (abstracted as inputs) to a parameter server which then generates an aggregate (e.g., averaged) model that is sent back to the clients as an initializing point for a new round of local training. To enhance the data privacy of the clients, secure aggregation protocols are developed using techniques from cryptography to ensure that the server infers no more information of the users' inputs beyond the desired aggregated input, even if the server can collude with some users. Although laying the ground for understanding the fundamental utility-security trade-off in secure aggregation, the simple star client-server architecture cannot capture more complex network architectures used in practical systems. Motivated by hierarchical federated learning, we investigate the secure aggregation problem in a $3$-layer hierarchical network consisting of clustered users connecting to an aggregation server through an intermediate layer of relays. Besides the conventional server security which requires that the server learns nothing beyond the desired sum of inputs, relay security is also imposed so that the relays infer nothing about the users' inputs and remain oblivious. For such a hierarchical secure aggregation (HSA) problem, we characterize the optimal multifaceted trade-off between communication (in terms of user-to-relay and relay-to-server communication rates) and secret key generation efficiency (in terms of individual key and source key rates).