Multi-class within-day dynamic traffic equilibrium with strategic travel time information

Abstract

Most research on within-day dynamic traffic equilibrium with information provision implicitly considers travel time information, often assuming information to be perfect or imperfect based on travelers' perception error. However, lacking explicit formulation of information limits insightful analysis of information impact on dynamic traffic equilibrium and the potential benefits of leveraging information provision to improve system-level performance. To address this gap, this paper proposes a within-day dynamic traffic equilibrium model that explicitly formulates strategic information provision as an endogenous element. In the proposed framework, two classes of travelers receive different types of travel time information: one class receives instantaneous travel time reflecting the prevailing traffic conditions, while the other class receives strategic forecasts of travel times, generated by accounting for travelers' reactions to instantaneous information based on strategic thinking from behavioral game theory. The resulting multi-class within-day dynamic equilibrium differs from existing models by explicitly modeling information provision and consideration of information consistency. The inherent dynamics of real-time updated traffic information, traffic conditions, and travelers' choice behaviors are analytically modeled, with the resulting dynamic equilibrium formulated as a fixed-point problem. The theoretical propositions and numerical findings offer rich insights into the impact of information on the traffic network, strategic forecast information penetration, the relationship between the proposed equilibrium and traditional dynamic traffic equilibria, and information accuracy. This research contributes to a deeper understanding of the interplay between information and traffic dynamics, paving the way for more effective traffic management strategies.