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arXiv · 2410.15861

Analysis of short-run and long-run marginal costs of generation in the power market

Shamim Homaei·Simon Roussanaly·Asgeir Tomasgard
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Abstract

In power markets, understanding the cost dynamics of electricity generation is crucial. The complexity of price formation in the power system arises from its diverse attributes, such as various generator types, each characterized by its specific fixed and variable costs as well as different lifetimes. In this paper, we adopt an approach that investigates both long-run marginal cost (LRMC) and short-run marginal cost (SRMC) in a perfect competition market. According to economic theory, marginal pricing serves as an effective method for determining the generation cost of electricity. This paper presents a capacity expansion model designed to evaluate the marginal cost of electricity generation, encompassing both long-term and short-term perspectives. Following a parametric analysis and the calculation of LRMCs, this study investigates the allocation of investment costs across various time periods and how these costs factor into the LRMC to ensure cost recovery. Additionally, an exploration of SRMCs reveals the conditions under which LRMCs and SRMCs converge or diverge. We observe that when there is a disparity between LRMC and SRMC, setting electricity generation prices equal to SRMCs does not ensure the complete recovery of investment and operational costs. This phenomenon holds implications for market reliability and challenges the pricing strategies that rely solely on SRMCs. Furthermore, our investigation highlighted the significance of addressing degeneracy in the power market modeling. Primal degeneracy in the SRMC model can result in multiple values for the dual variable representing SRMC. This multiplicity of values creates ambiguity regarding the precise SRMC value, making it challenging to ascertain the correct estimation. As a result, resolving degeneracy will ensure the reliability of the SRMC value, consequently enhancing the robustness and credibility of our analysis.

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Shamim Homaei, Simon Roussanaly, Asgeir Tomasgard. 2024-10-21. Analysis of short-run and long-run marginal costs of generation in the power market. https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.15861

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