SearcharxivSearch

arXiv · 2411.10600

Monetary Incentives, Landowner Preferences: Estimating Cross-Elasticities in Farmland Conversion to Renewable Energy

Abstract

This study examines the impact of monetary factors on the conversion of farmland to renewable energy generation, specifically solar and wind, in the context of expanding U.S. energy production. We propose a new econometric method that accounts for the diverse circumstances of landowners, including their unordered alternative land use options, non-monetary benefits from farming, and the influence of local regulations. We demonstrate that identifying the cross elasticity of landowners' farming income in relation to the conversion of farmland to renewable energy requires an understanding of their preferences. By utilizing county legislation that we assume to be shaped by land-use preferences, we estimate the cross-elasticities of farming income. Our findings indicate that monetary incentives may only influence landowners' decisions in areas with potential for future residential development, underscoring the importance of considering both preferences and regulatory contexts.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

BibTeXRIS

Chad Fiechter, Binayak Kunwar, Guy Tchuente. 2024-11-15. Monetary Incentives, Landowner Preferences: Estimating Cross-Elasticities in Farmland Conversion to Renewable Energy. https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.10600

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

Identification in Linear Quantile Panel Models

This paper studies identification in linear quantile panel models with unrestricted individual heterogeneity when the number of time periods is fixed and small. We impose strict exogeneity, whereby the conditional quantile restriction holds given the individual's complete regressor history and latent individual effect, but otherwise allow the disturbances to be arbitrarily dependent over time.

econ.EM

Experimental Design for Policy Choice

We show how to optimally design experiments when the resulting data will be used to choose a welfare-maximizing policy subject to constraints. A decision maker seeks to maximize Bayes expected welfare by choosing a policy whose effects depend on an unknown finite-dimensional parameter. The decision maker has access to a first wave of experimental data with a fixed design but may choose the design of a second wave that will be collected before choosing the policy. The resulting experimental design--policy choice problem is a very high-dimensional dynamic program that is generally intractable in finite samples. We propose a tractable approximation based on the limit experiment and show it is asymptotically optimal using a new asymptotic representation theorem for adaptive experiments with continuous treatments. We apply the method to a conditional cash transfer experiment and demonstrate the potential for large gains from tailoring the experiment to the policy choice.

econ.EM

Designing Spatial Treatments

Spatial treatments are interventions assigned to locations potentially distinct from those of the responding units. We study their optimal design under a general model in which a unit's response diminishes with distance to a treated site. Our estimand of interest is an ``uncontaminated'' effect equal to the average impact of a single intervention site over all hypothetical sites. We propose a novel design based on a Mat\'{e}rn point process which separates treatments by a distance of at least $r$. A larger choice of $r$ reduces bias by separating interventions but increases variance by reducing their numerosity. We choose $r$ to maximize the rate of convergence of a Horvitz-Thompson estimator and prove that this is minimax rate-optimal. We provide weak conditions under which the estimator is asymptotically normal and propose a variance estimator.

econ.EM