Sequence and Consequence

Abstract

In the course of proving a tenability result about the probabilities of conditionals, van Fraassen (1976) introduced a semantics for conditionals based on omega-sequences of worlds, which amounts to a particularly simple special case of ordering semantics for conditionals. On that semantics, 'If p, then q' is true at an omega-sequence just in case q is true at the first tail of the sequence where p is true (if such a tail exists). This approach has become increasingly popular in recent years. However, its logic has never been explored. We axiomatize the logic of omega-sequence semantics, showing that it is the result of adding two new axioms to Stalnaker's logic C2: one, Flattening, which is prima facie attractive, and, and a second, Sequentiality, which is complex and difficult to assess, but, we argue, likely invalid. But we also show that when sequence semantics is generalized from omega-sequences to arbitrary (transfinite) ordinal sequences, the result is a more attractive logic that adds only Flattening to C2. We also explore the logics of a few other interesting restrictions of ordinal sequence semantics. Finally, we address the question of whether sequence semantics is motivated by probabilistic considerations, answering, pace van Fraassen, in the negative.