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arXiv · 2411.18978

Warfare Ignited Price Contagion Dynamics in Early Modern Europe

Emile Esmaili·Michael J. Puma·Francis Ludlow·Poul Holm·Eva Jobbova
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Abstract

Economic historians have long studied market integration and contagion dynamics during periods of warfare and global stress, but there is a lack of model-based evidence on these phenomena. This paper uses an econometric contagion model, the Diebold-Yilmaz framework, to examine the dynamics of economic shocks across European markets in the early modern period. Our findings suggest that key periods of violent conflicts significantly increased food price spillover across cities, causing widespread disruptions across Europe. We also demonstrate the ability of this framework to capture relevant historical dynamics between the main trade centers of the period.

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Emile Esmaili, Michael J. Puma, Francis Ludlow, Poul Holm, Eva Jobbova. 2024-11-28. Warfare Ignited Price Contagion Dynamics in Early Modern Europe. https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.18978

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