arXiv · 2411.19377
Feedback Nash equilibria for scalar N-player linear quadratic dynamic games
Abstract
Considering infinite-horizon, discrete-time, linear quadratic, N-player dynamic games with scalar dynamics, a graphical representation of feedback Nash equilibrium solutions is provided. This representation is utilised to derive conditions for the number and properties of different feedback Nash equilibria a game may admit. The results are illustrated via a numerical example.
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Benita Nortmann, Mario Sassano, Thulasi Mylvaganam. 2024-11-28. Feedback Nash equilibria for scalar N-player linear quadratic dynamic games. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.automatica.2025.112133
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