SearcharxivSearch

arXiv · 2412.00424

FairSort: Learning to Fair Rank for Personalized Recommendations in Two-Sided Platforms

Abstract

Traditional recommendation systems focus on maximizing user satisfaction by suggesting their favourite items. This user-centric approach may lead to unfair exposure distribution among the providers. On the contrary, a provider-centric design might become unfair to the users. Therefore, this paper proposes a re-ranking model FairSort to find a trade-off solution among user-side fairness, provider-side fairness, and personalized recommendations utility. Previous works habitually treat this issue as a knapsack problem, incorporating both-side fairness as constraints. In this paper, we adopt a novel perspective, treating each recommendation list as a runway rather than a knapsack. In this perspective, each item on the runway gains a velocity and runs within a specific time, achieving re-ranking for both-side fairness. Meanwhile, we ensure the Minimum Utility Guarantee for personalized recommendations by designing a Binary Search approach. This can provide more reliable recommendations compared to the conventional greedy strategy based on the knapsack problem. We further broaden the applicability of FairSort, designing two versions for online and offline recommendation scenarios. Theoretical analysis and extensive experiments on real-world datasets indicate that FairSort can ensure more reliable personalized recommendations while considering fairness for both the provider and user.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

BibTeXRIS

Guoli Wu, Zhiyong Feng, Shizhan Chen, Hongyue Wu, Xiao Xue, Jianmao Xiao, Guodong Fan, Hongqi Chen, Jingyu Li. 2024-11-30. FairSort: Learning to Fair Rank for Personalized Recommendations in Two-Sided Platforms. https://doi.org/10.1109/tkde.2024.3509912

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

MMS Allocation for Chores with Online Agent Arrivals

We study the fair allocation of $m$ indivisible chores to $n$ agents with subadditive cost functions arriving online in an arbitrary order. Upon an agent's arrival, we are informed of her cost function and must irrevocably assign her a set of chores. We focus on the Maximin Share (MMS) fairness notion and aim to compute an allocation in which all items are assigned, and no agent incurs a cost more than $\alpha$ times her MMS. Without any prior information about the instance (other than $n$ and $m$), we design an algorithm with a competitive ratio of $O(\min\{n, k\log^{1+\epsilon}k, \log m\})$ for any constant $\epsilon > 0$, where $k$ denotes the number of cost function types. Our bound matches the best known offline approximation guarantees for MMS under subadditive costs and is nearly optimal with respect to all three parameters: we show that even for binary additive cost functions, no online algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio of $o(\min\{n, k\log k, \log m\})$. We then consider the setting in which the $k$ cost function types are known in advance (though the realized types of arriving agents are not). For additive cost functions, we provide an algorithm with a competitive ratio of $O(\min\{\log k, \log(kn)/\log\log(kn)\})$, and show that constant-competitive algorithms do not exist for general $k$, even for the binary additive setting. For binary additive functions when $k \le n$, we propose a $3$-competitive algorithm and establish a lower bound of $2$.

cs.GT

Truncated Noisy Best-Response Algorithms: Toward Game Theoretic Learning with Safety Guarantees

We consider a game theoretic approach to solve multi-agent coordination problems with submodular maximization objectives. It is known for such problems that the Nash equilibria for the corresponding game are always within 50% of the optimal, but that the equilibria which achieve this worst-case bound are not stable. To exploit this instability, we propose a family of algorithms which we call Truncated Noisy Best-Response (TNBR) Algorithms. These algorithms are flexibly characterized by agents asynchronously and stochastically selecting actions from a neighbourhood of their best response payoffs. We compute bounds on the recurrent classes of TNBR algorithms' associated Markov chains. Our bounds fall into two categories: first, "Performance" bounds ensure that TNBR algorithms always have a high-value recurrent state; second, "Safety" bounds ensure that TNBR algorithms never have arbitrarily-bad recurrent states. Furthermore, these two types of bounds are linked by a waterbed-like effect: every game with a poor Safety guarantee necessarily has a favorable Performance guarantee.

cs.GT

Existence of the Core in Approval-Based Committee Elections

We settle the main open question in the theory of approval-based multi-winner elections: we show that there always exists a committee in the core. The core is a stability and group fairness concept. The proof introduces a new voting rule that optimizes an entropy-like objective function over committees and payment systems. All local optima of this objective function lie in the core, which implies that a core committee can be found in polynomial time.

cs.GT