Searcharxiv⌕ Search
Home/Archive/arXiv

arXiv · 2501.16090

Galaxy Era: Agent-based Simulation of Execution Tickets

Pascal Stichler
View original source ↗Read source document ↗Export metadata ↓

Abstract

Execution Tickets are currently discussed as a next evolutionary step in Ethereum's block space allocation mechanism, separating consensus rewards from execution rewards and selling execution rights through a dedicated market. We present a theoretical framework identifying three core objectives for this mechanism - Decentralization, MEV capture, and Block Producer Incentive Compatibility - alongside practical metrics for evaluating each objective. To meet these goals, we explore seven key design parameters: ticket quantity, expiry, refundability, resalability, enhanced lookahead, pricing mechanism, and target ticket amount. We then evaluate four pricing mechanisms and construct six concrete mechanism designs from these parameters. To assess trade-offs in real-world conditions, we perform an agent-based simulation with over 300 runs. Our findings suggest that auction-driven formats, particularly second-price, excel in capturing significant MEV. The simulation also indicates that offering a secondary market can help alleviate centralization, since specialized ticket holders can enter and exit the market as needed. Non-expiring tickets show promise in reducing valuation risks, as ticket holders are not influenced by expiry-related discounting. Likewise, removing refundability simplifies the mechanism without notably impairing performance. Extended lookahead periods benefit price predictability and smoothness at a slight cost to price accuracy. Overall, this study provides a theoretical framework on the mechanism design space for Execution Tickets as well as a practical implementation of an agent-based simulation to test mechanism design choices. Further, it provides an exploratory evaluation of Execution Ticket mechanism designs, offering insights into optimal configurations that balance MEV capture, decentralization, and operational efficiency in Ethereum's block space allocation.

Explore related subjects

cs.GT

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

Pascal Stichler. 2025-01-27. Galaxy Era: Agent-based Simulation of Execution Tickets. https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.16090

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

arXiv2026

MMS Allocation for Chores with Online Agent Arrivals

We study the fair allocation of $m$ indivisible chores to $n$ agents with subadditive cost functions arriving online in an arbitrary order. Upon an agent's arrival, we are informed of her cost function and must irrevocably assign her a set of chores. We focus on the Maximin Share (MMS) fairness notion and aim to compute an allocation in which all items are assigned, and no agent incurs a cost more than $\alpha$ times her MMS. Without any prior information about the instance (other than $n$ and $m$), we design an algorithm with a competitive ratio of $O(\min\{n, k\log^{1+\epsilon}k, \log m\})$ for any constant $\epsilon > 0$, where $k$ denotes the number of cost function types. Our bound matches the best known offline approximation guarantees for MMS under subadditive costs and is nearly optimal with respect to all three parameters: we show that even for binary additive cost functions, no online algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio of $o(\min\{n, k\log k, \log m\})$. We then consider the setting in which the $k$ cost function types are known in advance (though the realized types of arriving agents are not). For additive cost functions, we provide an algorithm with a competitive ratio of $O(\min\{\log k, \log(kn)/\log\log(kn)\})$, and show that constant-competitive algorithms do not exist for general $k$, even for the binary additive setting. For binary additive functions when $k \le n$, we propose a $3$-competitive algorithm and establish a lower bound of $2$.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2026

Truncated Noisy Best-Response Algorithms: Toward Game Theoretic Learning with Safety Guarantees

We consider a game theoretic approach to solve multi-agent coordination problems with submodular maximization objectives. It is known for such problems that the Nash equilibria for the corresponding game are always within 50% of the optimal, but that the equilibria which achieve this worst-case bound are not stable. To exploit this instability, we propose a family of algorithms which we call Truncated Noisy Best-Response (TNBR) Algorithms. These algorithms are flexibly characterized by agents asynchronously and stochastically selecting actions from a neighbourhood of their best response payoffs. We compute bounds on the recurrent classes of TNBR algorithms' associated Markov chains. Our bounds fall into two categories: first, "Performance" bounds ensure that TNBR algorithms always have a high-value recurrent state; second, "Safety" bounds ensure that TNBR algorithms never have arbitrarily-bad recurrent states. Furthermore, these two types of bounds are linked by a waterbed-like effect: every game with a poor Safety guarantee necessarily has a favorable Performance guarantee.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2026

Existence of the Core in Approval-Based Committee Elections

We settle the main open question in the theory of approval-based multi-winner elections: we show that there always exists a committee in the core. The core is a stability and group fairness concept. The proof introduces a new voting rule that optimizes an entropy-like objective function over committees and payment systems. All local optima of this objective function lie in the core, which implies that a core committee can be found in polynomial time.

cs.GT↗