arXiv · 2502.12286
Rational Capability in Concurrent Games
Abstract
We extend concurrent game structures (CGSs) with a simple notion of preference over computations and define a minimal notion of rationality for agents based on the concept of dominance. We use this notion to interpret a CL and an ATL languages that extend the basic CL and ATL languages with modalities for rational capability, namely, a coalition's capability to rationally enforce a given property. For each of these languages, we provide results about the complexity of satisfiability checking and model checking as well as about axiomatization.
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Yinfeng Li, Emiliano Lorini, Munyque Mittelmann. 2025-02-17. Rational Capability in Concurrent Games. https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.12286
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