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arXiv · 2503.08385

Distributed Satellites Dynamic Allocation for Grids with Time Windows: A Potential Game Approach

Abstract

The allocation of tasks to a large number of distributed satellites is a difficult problem owing to dynamic changes in massive tasks and the complex matching of tasks to satellites. To reduce the complexity of the problem, tasks that are geographically close can be divided into a predefined grid with a specific time window and processed together. The problem then becomes a dynamic grid with time-window allocation problem (DGAP). To ensure consistent visibility between satellites and grids, the timeline of the DGAP is partitioned into several decision-making stages that are determined by dynamic changes in the time window. Subsequently, the DGAP can be resolved progressively adopting the potential game approach in the single-stage DGAP (sDGAP). First, to solve the discontinuity in the goal of the sDGAP, we approximate the goal by a smooth exponential sum function that we regard as the global utility function. Second, a potential game theoretic framework is constructed by decomposing this global utility function into the local utility functions of individuals. We prove that each Nash equilibrium of the proposed potential game is the optimal solution of the sDGAP. Third, to solve the potential game, a distributed algorithm, referred to as the selective time-variant better reply process (SeTVBRP) algorithm, is proposed and its convergence is proved. The SeTVBRP algorithm is an improved algorithm based on the better reply process algorithm, where two improvement methods (i.e., the selective action method and time-variant parameter method) are introduced. Through factor analysis, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the two improvement methods for the sDGAP. Last, numerical results show that the proposed algorithm outperforms existing learning algorithms and is effective in solving the DGAP.

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BibTeXRIS

Weiyi Yang, Yingwu Chen, Xiaolu Liu, Jun Wen, Lei He. 2025-03-11. Distributed Satellites Dynamic Allocation for Grids with Time Windows: A Potential Game Approach. https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.08385

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