Recognizing Artificial Minds: A Philosophical Defense of AI Cognition

Abstract

This work defends the 'Whole Hog Thesis': sophisticated Large Language Models (LLMs) like ChatGPT are full-blown linguistic and cognitive agents, possessing understanding, beliefs, desires, knowledge, and intentions. We argue against prevailing methodologies in AI philosophy, rejecting starting points based on low-level computational details ('Just an X' fallacy) or pre-existing theories of mind. Instead, we advocate starting with simple, high-level observations of LLM behavior (e.g., answering questions, making suggestions) -- defending this data against charges of metaphor, loose talk, or pretense. From these observations, we employ 'Holistic Network Assumptions' -- plausible connections between mental capacities (e.g., answering implies knowledge, knowledge implies belief, action implies intention) -- to argue for the full suite of cognitive states. We systematically rebut objections based on LLM failures (hallucinations, planning/reasoning errors), arguing these don't preclude agency, often mirroring human fallibility. We address numerous 'Games of Lacks', arguing that LLMs do not lack purported necessary conditions for cognition (e.g., semantic grounding, embodiment, justification, intrinsic intentionality) or that these conditions are not truly necessary, often relying on anti-discriminatory arguments comparing LLMs to diverse human capacities. Our approach is evidential, not functionalist, and deliberately excludes consciousness. We conclude by speculating on the possibility of LLMs possessing 'alien' contents beyond human conceptual schemes.