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arXiv · 2504.16617

Security Science (SecSci), Basic Concepts and Mathematical Foundations

Dusko Pavlovic·Peter-Michael Seidel
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Abstract

This textbook compiles the lecture notes from security courses taught at Oxford in the 2000s, at Royal Holloway in the 2010s, and currently in Hawaii. The early chapters are suitable for a first course in security. The middle chapters have been used in advanced courses. Towards the end there are also some research problems.

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BibTeXRIS

Dusko Pavlovic, Peter-Michael Seidel. 2025-04-23. Security Science (SecSci), Basic Concepts and Mathematical Foundations. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-00949-4

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