Weak-Jamming Detection in IEEE 802.11 Networks: Techniques, Scenarios and Mobility

Abstract

State-of-the-art solutions detect jamming attacks ex-post, i.e., only when jamming has already disrupted the wireless communication link. In many scenarios, e.g., mobile networks or static deployments distributed over a large geographical area, it is often desired to detect jamming at the early stage, when it affects the communication link enough to be detected but not sufficiently to disrupt it (detection of weak jamming signals). Under such assumptions, devices can enhance situational awareness and promptly apply mitigation, e.g., moving away from the jammed area in mobile scenarios or changing communication frequency in static deployments, before jamming fully disrupts the communication link. Although some contributions recently demonstrated the feasibility of detecting low-power and weak jamming signals, they make simplistic assumptions far from real-world deployments. Given the current state of the art, no evidence exists that detection of weak jamming can be considered with real-world communication technologies. In this paper, we provide and comprehensively analyze new general-purpose strategies for detecting weak jamming signals, compatible by design with one of the most relevant communication technologies used by commercial-off-the-shelf devices, i.e., IEEE 802.11. We describe two operational modes: (i) binary classification via Convolutional Neural Networks and (ii) one-class classification via Sparse Autoencoders. We evaluate and compare the proposed approaches with the current state-of-the-art using data collected through an extensive real-world experimental campaign in three relevant environments. At the same time, we made the dataset available to the public. Our results demonstrate that detecting weak jamming signals is feasible in all considered real-world environments, and we provide an in-depth analysis considering different techniques, scenarios, and mobility patterns.