Evolving HPC services to enable ML workloads on HPE Cray EX

Stefano Schuppli; Fawzi Mohamed; Henrique Mendonça; Nina Mujkanovic; Elia Palme; Dino Conciatore; Lukas Drescher; Miguel Gila; Pim Witlox; Joost VandeVondele; Maxime Martinasso; Thomas C. Schulthess; Torsten Hoefler

arXiv · 2507.01880

Evolving HPC services to enable ML workloads on HPE Cray EX

Stefano Schuppli·Fawzi Mohamed·Henrique Mendonça·Nina Mujkanovic·Elia Palme·Dino Conciatore·Lukas Drescher·Miguel Gila·Pim Witlox·Joost VandeVondele·Maxime Martinasso·Thomas C. Schulthess·Torsten Hoefler

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Abstract

The Alps Research Infrastructure leverages GH200 technology at scale, featuring 10,752 GPUs. Accessing Alps provides a significant computational advantage for researchers in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML). While Alps serves a broad range of scientific communities, traditional HPC services alone are not sufficient to meet the dynamic needs of the ML community. This paper presents an initial investigation into extending HPC service capabilities to better support ML workloads. We identify key challenges and gaps we have observed since the early-access phase (2023) of Alps by the Swiss AI community and propose several technological enhancements. These include a user environment designed to facilitate the adoption of HPC for ML workloads, balancing performance with flexibility; a utility for rapid performance screening of ML applications during development; observability capabilities and data products for inspecting ongoing large-scale ML workloads; a utility to simplify the vetting of allocated nodes for compute readiness; a service plane infrastructure to deploy various types of workloads, including support and inference services; and a storage infrastructure tailored to the specific needs of ML workloads. These enhancements aim to facilitate the execution of ML workloads on HPC systems, increase system usability and resilience, and better align with the needs of the ML community. We also discuss our current approach to security aspects. This paper concludes by placing these proposals in the broader context of changes in the communities served by HPC infrastructure like ours.

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Stefano Schuppli, Fawzi Mohamed, Henrique Mendonça, Nina Mujkanovic, Elia Palme, Dino Conciatore, Lukas Drescher, Miguel Gila, Pim Witlox, Joost VandeVondele, Maxime Martinasso, Thomas C. Schulthess, Torsten Hoefler. 2025-07-02. Evolving HPC services to enable ML workloads on HPE Cray EX. https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.01880

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