SearcharxivSearch

arXiv · 2507.15054

Equity, Emissions and the Inflation Reduction Act

Abstract

Preowned vehicles are disproportionally purchased by low-income households, a group that has long been unable to purchase electric vehicles. Yet, low-income households would disproportionally benefit from EV adoption given the operating costs savings offered by electrification. To help realize this benefit, provisions of the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act offer preowned EV purchasing incentives. How effective might these efforts be. Leveraging data from the United States Census Bureau, the National Household Travel Survey, and the Greenhouse gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy use in Technologies Model, we address this question. Our findings are fourfold. First, we demonstrate that although low-income households are more likely to benefit from preowned EV purchasing incentives offered by IRA, up to 8.4 million low-income households may be ineligible owing to heterogeneity in vehicle procurement pathways. Second, we show that program ineligibility risks preventing up to 113.9 million tons in lifecycle emissions reduction benefits from being realized. Third, we find that procurement pathways depend on vehicle price. More expensive preowned vehicles are purchased directly from commercial dealers, while less expensive preowned vehicles are purchased from private sellers. These procurement pathways matter because qualification for IRA incentives necessitates purchasing solely from commercial dealers. Fourth, we demonstrate that while incentives motivating preowned vehicle purchases from commercial dealers may be effective if the vehicle is expensive, this effectiveness diminishes at higher price points. The implications of our findings on decarbonization efforts and energy policy are discussed.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

BibTeXRIS

Lucas Woodley, Chung Yi See, Daniel Palmer, Ashley Nunes. 2025-07-20. Equity, Emissions and the Inflation Reduction Act. https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.15054

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

Reducing Prescription Errors Through Information Intervention: A Field Experiment in Healthcare Operations

Drug-drug interaction (DDI) errors pose serious risks to patient safety. Existing decision-support systems often require physicians to respond to alerts, disrupting workflows and contributing to high override rates. We examine whether a non-mandatory information intervention can reduce DDI errors and foster learning. Using a randomized field experiment with India's largest electronic medical record platform, we analyze 2.81 million prescriptions from 1,700 physicians using a difference-in-differences design. Treatment physicians received real-time information highlighting DDI errors without being required to respond, while control physicians received no such information. The intervention reduced DDI errors by 8.6%, corresponding to an estimated US$4.8 million in annual hospitalization cost savings and approximately 134 lives potentially saved. We identify two mechanisms: reactive correction, whereby physicians remove errors after they are flagged, and proactive learning, whereby they avoid errors before alerts occur. While early reductions are driven primarily by correction, physicians increasingly avoid errors over time. They also become less likely to repeat previously flagged errors and reduce new errors, suggesting that learning generalizes beyond specific drug pairs. The effects are consistent across physician types and do not compromise productivity or care quality. Our findings show that non-mandatory information interventions can improve patient safety through both immediate error correction and persistent, generalizable learning.

econ.GN

How an Economy Shrinks in Space: Concavity-on-Jobs and Upward Consolidation under Demographic Decline

When a country's population declines, the aggregate economy appears to contract on the intensive margin: industrial diversity intact, every industry a little smaller. At the regional level, contraction is uneven and takes the extensive form: entire industries disappear, one after another. The relevant unit is the city: industries are nested by size - the hierarchy property of industrial location - each viable only above a minimum population. Necessity industries' thresholds bunch at the low end, so a city's industry count - and its jobs - is sharply concave in size (concavity on jobs). A modest loss pushes a small city below many thresholds at once; a large core sheds a few specialized industries, one at a time. Lost industries consolidate upward to the next city large enough to host them; for the worker it means a step down to a lower-paid local job. To recover that income, workers move up to the apex - the only city hosting the full industry range. Studying Japan - two decades ahead of the OECD, Tokyo at its apex - with worker-level panel data on the young workers who carry the migration, a wage regression in real, housing-inclusive wages identifies a Tokyo-bound migration incentive that varies by origin, following concavity on jobs.

econ.GN

Do wind and solar curtail at negative electricity prices? Incentives and evidence across two decades of German renewable support schemes

In many power systems, wind and solar generation increasingly often exceeds electricity demand. Curtailing renewable generation in those hours matters both for prices and for the physical stability of the grid. Turning off wind turbines and solar panels is technically easier than ramping down a large power station, yet support schemes often give renewables an economic incentive to keep producing at negative prices. This paper studies wind and solar energy in Germany. For each cohort of generators it estimates, hour by hour, the incentive implied by two decades of support policy. It then sets those incentives against observed behavior, using a new estimate of market-based curtailment built from reanalysis weather data. I find that in 2025, at prices below -50 EUR/MWh, almost all wind generators had an incentive to stop producing, but only half of them did. Solar is the opposite case: nearly two thirds of the potential had no incentive to curtail at all, mostly because it receives a feed-in tariff that shields it from wholesale prices. Of the exposed remainder, just over a fifth cut production. Low exposure and response rates inflate subsidy payments and make the power system harder to operate safely. I conclude that a further expansion of wind and solar requires them to respond to price signals.

econ.GN