arXiv · 2507.19123
Existence of Strong Randomized Equilibria in Mean-Field Games of Optimal Stopping with Common Noise
Abstract
We study a mean-field game of optimal stopping and investigate the existence of strong solutions via a connection with the Bank-El Karoui's representation problem. Under certain continuity assumptions, where the common noise is generated by a countable partition, we show that a strong randomized mean-field equilibrium exists, in which the mean-field interaction term is adapted to the common noise and the stopping time is randomized. Furthermore, under suitable monotonicity assumptions and for a general common noise, we provide a comparative statics analysis of the set of strong mean-field equilibria with strict equilibrium stopping times.
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Giorgio Ferrari, Anna Pajola. 2025-07-25. Existence of Strong Randomized Equilibria in Mean-Field Games of Optimal Stopping with Common Noise. https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.19123
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