arXiv · 2507.20250
A Truthful Mechanism Design for Distributed Optimisation Algorithms in Networks with Self-interested Agents
Abstract
Enhancing resilience in multi-agent systems in the face of selfish agents is an important problem that requires further characterisation. This work develops a truthful mechanism that avoids self-interested and strategic agents maliciously manipulating the algorithm. We prove theoretically that the proposed mechanism incentivises self-interested agents to participate and follow the provided algorithm faithfully. Additionally, the mechanism is compatible with any distributed optimisation algorithm that can calculate at least one subgradient at a given point. Finally, we present an illustrative example that shows the effectiveness of the mechanism.
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Tianyi Zhong, David Angeli. 2025-07-27. A Truthful Mechanism Design for Distributed Optimisation Algorithms in Networks with Self-interested Agents. https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.20250
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