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arXiv · 2508.13364

A Risk Manager for Intrusion Tolerant Systems: Enhancing HAL 9000 with New Scoring and Data Sources

Tadeu Freitas·Carlos Novo·Inês Dutra·João Soares·Manuel Correia·Benham Shariati·Rolando Martins
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Abstract

Intrusion Tolerant Systems (ITSs) have become increasingly critical due to the rise of multi-domain adversaries exploiting diverse attack surfaces. ITS architectures aim to tolerate intrusions, ensuring system compromise is prevented or mitigated even with adversary presence. Existing ITS solutions often employ Risk Managers leveraging public security intelligence to adjust system defenses dynamically against emerging threats. However, these approaches rely heavily on databases like NVD and ExploitDB, which require manual analysis for newly discovered vulnerabilities. This dependency limits the system's responsiveness to rapidly evolving threats. HAL 9000, an ITS Risk Manager introduced in our prior work, addressed these challenges through machine learning. By analyzing descriptions of known vulnerabilities, HAL 9000 predicts and assesses new vulnerabilities automatically. To calculate the risk of a system, it also incorporates the Exploitability Probability Scoring system to estimate the likelihood of exploitation within 30 days, enhancing proactive defense capabilities. Despite its success, HAL 9000's reliance on NVD and ExploitDB knowledge is a limitation, considering the availability of other sources of information. This extended work introduces a custom-built scraper that continuously mines diverse threat sources, including security advisories, research forums, and real-time exploit proofs-of-concept. This significantly expands HAL 9000's intelligence base, enabling earlier detection and assessment of unverified vulnerabilities. Our evaluation demonstrates that integrating scraper-derived intelligence with HAL 9000's risk management framework substantially improves its ability to address emerging threats. This paper details the scraper's integration into the architecture, its role in providing additional information on new threats, and the effects on HAL 9000's management.

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Tadeu Freitas, Carlos Novo, Inês Dutra, João Soares, Manuel Correia, Benham Shariati, Rolando Martins. 2025-08-18. A Risk Manager for Intrusion Tolerant Systems: Enhancing HAL 9000 with New Scoring and Data Sources. https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.13364

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