Mean-Variance Stackelberg Games with Asymmetric Information

Yu-Jui Huang; Shihao Zhu

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arXiv · 2509.03669

Mean-Variance Stackelberg Games with Asymmetric Information

Yu-Jui Huang·Shihao Zhu

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Abstract

This paper considers two investors who perform mean-variance portfolio selection with asymmetric information: one knows the true stock dynamics, while the other has to infer the true dynamics from observed stock evolution. Their portfolio selection is interconnected through relative performance concerns, i.e., each investor is concerned about not only her terminal wealth, but how it compares to the average terminal wealth of both investors. We model this as Stackelberg competition: the partially-informed investor (the "follower") observes the trading behavior of the fully-informed investor (the "leader") and decides her trading strategy accordingly; the leader, anticipating the follower's response, in turn selects a trading strategy that best suits her objective. To prevent information leakage, the leader adopts a randomized strategy selected under an entropy-regularized mean-variance objective, where the entropy regularizer quantifies the randomness of a chosen strategy. The follower, on the other hand, observes only the actual trading actions of the leader (sampled from the randomized strategy), but not the randomized strategy itself. Her mean-variance objective is thus a random field, in the form of an expectation conditioned on a realized path of the leader's trading actions. In the idealized case of continuous sampling of the leader's trading actions, we derive a Stackelberg equilibrium where the follower's trading strategy depends linearly on the actual trading actions of the leader and the leader samples her trading actions from Gaussian distributions. In the realistic case of discrete sampling of the leader's trading actions, the above becomes an $\epsilon$-Stackelberg equilibrium.

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BibTeX RIS

Yu-Jui Huang, Shihao Zhu. 2025-09-03. Mean-Variance Stackelberg Games with Asymmetric Information. https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.03669

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