arXiv · 2509.15090
Emergent Alignment via Competition
Abstract
Aligning AI systems with human values remains a fundamental challenge, but does our inability to create perfectly aligned models preclude obtaining the benefits of alignment? We study a strategic setting where a human user interacts with multiple differently misaligned AI agents, none of which are individually well-aligned. Our key insight is that when the users utility lies approximately within the convex hull of the agents utilities, a condition that becomes easier to satisfy as model diversity increases, strategic competition can yield outcomes comparable to interacting with a perfectly aligned model. We model this as a multi-leader Stackelberg game, extending Bayesian persuasion to multi-round conversations between differently informed parties, and prove three results: (1) when perfect alignment would allow the user to learn her Bayes-optimal action, she can also do so in all equilibria under the convex hull condition (2) under weaker assumptions requiring only approximate utility learning, a non-strategic user employing quantal response achieves near-optimal utility in all equilibria and (3) when the user selects the best single AI after an evaluation period, equilibrium guarantees remain near-optimal without further distributional assumptions. We complement the theory with two sets of experiments.
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Natalie Collina, Surbhi Goel, Aaron Roth, Emily Ryu, Mirah Shi. 2025-09-18. Emergent Alignment via Competition. https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.15090
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