Deceptive Planning Exploiting Inattention Blindness

Abstract

We study decision-making with rational inattention in settings where agents have perception constraints. In such settings, inaccurate prior beliefs or models of others may lead to inattention blindness, where an agent is unaware of its incorrect beliefs. We model this phenomenon in two-player zero-sum stochastic games, where Player 1 has perception constraints and Player 2 deceptively deviates from its security policy presumed by Player 1 to gain an advantage. We formulate the perception constraints as an online sensor selection problem, develop a value-weighted objective function for sensor selection capturing rational inattention, and propose the greedy algorithm for selection under this monotone objective function. When Player 2 does not deviate from the presumed policy, this objective function provides an upper bound on the expected value loss compared to the security value where Player 1 has perfect information of the state. We then propose a myopic decision-making algorithm for Player 2 to exploit Player 1's beliefs by deviating from the presumed policy and, thereby, improve upon the security value. Numerical examples illustrate how Player 1 persistently chooses sensors that are consistent with its priors, allowing Player 2 to systematically exploit its inattention.