arXiv · 2510.05748
Communication Enables Cooperation in LLM Agents: A Comparison with Curriculum-Based Approaches
Abstract
Eliciting cooperation in multi-agent LLM systems is critical for AI alignment. We investigate two approaches: direct communication and curriculum learning. In a 4-player Stag Hunt, a one-word "cheap talk" channel increases cooperation from 0% to 96.7%, demonstrating communication as a robust coordination mechanism. In contrast, we find that curriculum learning is highly sensitive to design choices: our pedagogical curriculum through progressively complex games reduced agent payoffs by 27.4% in an Iterated Public Goods Game with Punishment, demonstrating that optimizing for short-term rationality can actively undermine alignment goals. Qualitative analysis reveals that curricula emphasizing defection-equilibrium games can induce "learned pessimism" in agents. These findings suggest that for coordination problems, simple communication protocols may be more reliable than experience-based training, and that curriculum design for social dilemmas requires careful attention to the strategic lessons embedded in game sequences.
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Hachem Madmoun, Salem Lahlou. 2025-10-07. Communication Enables Cooperation in LLM Agents: A Comparison with Curriculum-Based Approaches. https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.05748
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