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arXiv · 2510.08658

When Truth Does Not Take on Its Shoes: How Misinformation Spreads in Chatrooms

Shuige Liu
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Abstract

We examine how misinformation spreads in social networks composed of individuals with long-term offline relationships. Especially, we focus on why misinformation persists and diffuses despite being recognized by most as false. In our psychological game theoretical model, each agent who receives a piece of (mis)information must first decide how to react -- by openly endorsing it, remaining silent, or openly challenging it. After observing the reactions of her neighbors who also received the message, the agent then chooses whether to forward it to others in her own chatroom who have not yet received it. By distinguishing these two roles, our framework addresses puzzling real-world phenomena, such as the gap between what individuals privately believe and what they publicly transmit. A key assumption in our model is that, while perceived veracity influences decisions, the dominant factor is the alignment between an agent's beliefs and those of her social network -- a feature characteristic of communities formed through long-term offline relationships. This dynamic can lead agents to tacitly accept and even propagate information they privately judge to be of low credibility. Our results challenge the view that improving information literacy alone can curb the spread of misinformation. We show that when agents are highly sensitive to peer pressure and the network exhibits structural polarization, even if the majority does not genuinely believe in it, the message still can spread widely without encountering open resistance.

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Shuige Liu. 2025-10-09. When Truth Does Not Take on Its Shoes: How Misinformation Spreads in Chatrooms. https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.08658

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