On the Contingency of Logic in Possible World Semantics

Abstract

This paper investigates the contingency of logic within the framework of possible world semantics. Possible world semantics captures the meaning of necessitation, i.e., a statement is necessarily true if it holds in all possible worlds. Standard Kripkean semantics assumes that all possible worlds are governed by one single logic. We relax this assumption and introduce mixed models, in which different worlds may obey different logical systems. The paper provides a first case study where we mix classical propositional logic ($\mathsf{CPC}$) and intuitionistic propositional logic ($\mathsf{IPC}$) in the possible world semantics. We define the class of mixed models $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{M}(\mathsf{CPC}, \mathsf{IPC})$, together with a subclass of concrete mixed models ($\mathcal{CMM}$), and establish their semantic properties. Our main result shows that the set of formulas valid in $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{M}(\mathsf{CPC}, \mathsf{IPC})$ corresponds exactly to the intuitionistic modal logic $\mathsf{iK}$ extended with the Box Excluded Middle axiom ($\mathsf{iK} + \mathsf{bem}$). To demonstrate this, we prove soundness and completeness results linking $\mathcal{M}\mathcal{M}(\mathsf{CPC}, \mathsf{IPC})$ and $\mathcal{CMM}$, and birelational models for $\mathsf{iK} + \mathsf{bem}$.