Avoiding Epiphenomenalism in Theories of Consciousness: A Causal Framework Based on Asymmetry

Abstract

Why do some physical systems possess consciousness, while others do not? A scientific theory of consciousness must explain differences in system behavior in terms of well-defined internal mechanisms. However, many existing approaches introduce higher-level structural or informational descriptions without specifying how these structures contribute to the generation of behavior, raising the concern that they may become theoretically ineffective.A further difficulty arises from the status of causation. Attempts to introduce causally effective mental states appear to conflict with physical theory, while strictly physicalist accounts risk excluding higher-level causation altogether. We argue that this dilemma stems from a conflation of physical determination with causation. To address this issue, we distinguish between two complementary descriptive frameworks: the physical stance and the causal stance. While the physical stance represents systems in terms of state evolution, the causal stance introduces asymmetric relations that enable the explicit representation of internal mechanisms. We show that causal descriptions provide a more constrained and informative representation of internal structure and cannot, in general, be reconstructed from physical descriptions alone. Within this framework, we define mental causation in terms of intrinsic causes and propose the Dual-Laws Model (DLM), which explicitly implements whole-to-parts causal mechanisms. This approach provides a principled way to model the causal role of consciousness without violating physical determinism.