Securing UAV Communications by Fusing Cross-Layer Fingerprints

Abstract

The open nature of wireless communications renders unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) communications vulnerable to impersonation attacks, under which malicious UAVs can impersonate authorized ones with stolen digital certificates. Traditional fingerprint-based UAV authentication approaches rely on a single modality of sensory data gathered from a single layer of the network model, resulting in unreliable authentication experiences, particularly when UAVs are mobile and in an open-world environment. To transcend these limitations, this paper proposes SecureLink, a UAV authentication system that is among the first to employ cross-layer information for enhancing the efficiency and reliability of UAV authentication. Instead of using single modalities, SecureLink fuses physical-layer radio frequency (RF) fingerprints and application-layer micro-electromechanical system (MEMS) fingerprints into reliable UAV identifiers via multimodal fusion. SecureLink first aligns fingerprints from channel state information measurements and telemetry data, such as feedback readings of onboard accelerometers, gyroscopes, and barometers. Then, an attention-based neural network is devised for in-depth feature fusion. Next, the fused features are trained by a multi-similarity loss and fed into a one-class support vector machine for open-world authentication. We extensively implement our SecureLink using three different types of UAVs and evaluate it in different environments. With only six additional data frames, SecureLink achieves a closed-world accuracy of 98.61% and an open-world accuracy of 97.54% with two impersonating UAVs, outperforming the existing approaches in authentication robustness and communication overheads. Finally, our datasets collected from these experiments are available on GitHub: https://github.com/PhyGroup/SecureLink\_data.