SearcharxivSearch

arXiv · 2511.08060

From LLMs to Agents: A Comparative Evaluation of LLMs and LLM-based Agents in Security Patch Detection

Abstract

The widespread adoption of open-source software (OSS) has accelerated software innovation but also increased security risks due to the rapid propagation of vulnerabilities and silent patch releases. In recent years, large language models (LLMs) and LLM-based agents have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in various software engineering (SE) tasks, enabling them to effectively address software security challenges such as vulnerability detection. However, systematic evaluation of the capabilities of LLMs and LLM-based agents in security patch detection remains limited. To bridge this gap, we conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the performance of LLMs and LLM-based agents for security patch detection. Specifically, we investigate three methods: Plain LLM (a single LLM with a system prompt), Data-Aug LLM (data augmentation based on the Plain LLM), and the ReAct Agent (leveraging the thought-action-observation mechanism). We also evaluate the performance of both commercial and open-source LLMs under these methods and compare these results with those of existing baselines. Furthermore, we analyze the detection performance of these methods across various vulnerability types, and examine the impact of different prompting strategies and context window sizes on the results. Our findings reveal that the Data-Aug LLM achieves the best overall performance, whereas the ReAct Agent demonstrates the lowest false positive rate (FPR). Although baseline methods exhibit strong accuracy, their false positive rates are significantly higher. In contrast, our evaluated methods achieve comparable accuracy while substantially reducing the FPR. These findings provide valuable insights into the practical applications of LLMs and LLM-based agents in security patch detection, highlighting their advantage in maintaining robust performance while minimizing false positive rates.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

BibTeXRIS

Junxiao Han, Zheng Yu, Lingfeng Bao, Jiakun Liu, Yao Wan, Jianwei Yin, Shuiguang Deng, Song Han. 2025-11-11. From LLMs to Agents: A Comparative Evaluation of LLMs and LLM-based Agents in Security Patch Detection. https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.08060

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

Empirical Evaluation of Membership Inference Attacks on NLP Text Classifiers: A Baseline Study on SST-2

Membership inference attacks (MIAs) try to determine whether a specific record was used to train a model, a privacy risk that matters in natural language processing (NLP), where training data can contain sensitive user text. This paper presents a controlled benchmark of membership inference vulnerability for text classification on the GLUE SST-2 sentiment dataset. A TF-IDF + Logistic Regression pipeline and a fine-tuned DistilBERT classifier are compared under a loss-threshold MIA, with utility measured by development accuracy and macro F1. DistilBERT reached 0.9466 accuracy and 0.9460 macro F1 against 0.8756 and 0.8727 for Logistic Regression, yet both models leaked membership signal (Attack AUC 0.5615 and 0.5800, respectively). Two mitigations were tested. Stronger regularization reduced leakage for Logistic Regression at a visible utility cost, whereas fine-tuning DistilBERT for 2 epochs instead of 3 reduced leakage with negligible accuracy loss. Lightweight training adjustments can improve the privacy-utility trade-off without complex defenses.

cs.CR

Empirical Evaluation of Data Poisoning Attacks in Supervised Learning

Data poisoning corrupts training data to degrade a model or to plant attacker-controlled behavior. This study evaluates two representative training-time attacks, label flipping and backdoor poisoning, on MNIST and Fashion-MNIST with three baseline classifiers: Logistic Regression, Linear SVM, and Random Forest. Clean training is compared with poisoning rates of 5%, 10%, and 20% using clean-test accuracy, macro-precision, macro-recall, macro-F1, and, for backdoors, attack success rate. Label flipping caused clear degradation, largest for Logistic Regression and Linear SVM, while Random Forest stayed comparatively stable. Backdoor poisoning reached attack success rates from 0.9667 to 1.0000 on both datasets and all three models while often keeping clean-test performance near baseline. The results separate indiscriminate poisoning, which shows up in standard metrics, from targeted backdoor poisoning, which stays comparatively stealthy while embedding highly effective malicious behavior, and they support security-oriented evaluation beyond conventional clean-test metrics.

cs.CR

DeFiFusion: Combining Transaction Events with Smart Contracts to Detect Price Manipulation Attacks

Decentralized Finance (DeFi) has emerged as a rapidly growing blockchain-based financial service, where market transaction dynamics and underlying smart contract logic are intricately intertwined. This autonomous interplay, while eliminating centralized intermediaries, significantly expands the vulnerability surface of DeFi protocols to Price Manipulation Attacks (PMAs), which have already inflicted catastrophic financial losses. Despite their gravity, existing detection paradigms suffer from fundamental limitations. Transaction-centric methods lack awareness of contract execution semantics, making them prone to false positives under legitimate market volatility, while static contract analyses ignore real transaction behaviors and frequently report vulnerabilities that are infeasible to exploit in practice. We present DeFiFusion, a dual-modal PMA detection framework that closes this gap by jointly modeling transaction events and smart contract semantics within a unified pipeline. Our core insight is that PMA maliciousness emerges only from the interaction between transaction behaviors and the contract logic they exploit; neither signal suffices in isolation. Accordingly, we derive price-manipulation-aware event encoding for extracting fine-grained temporal and economic features tailored to manipulation patterns. We further introduce LLM-based contract semantic extraction to supply the execution-logic context that prior behavioral methods lack. To fuse these modalities, we propose a Dual-Modal Projection-Fusion Transformer with T5-style relative positional encoding, capturing the cyclic multi-stage execution structures that distinguish PMAs from benign market activity. Extensive experiments demonstrate that DeFiFusion consistently achieves state-of-the-art detection performance, effectively recalling 222 of the 225 PMA cases while maintaining a precision of 96.10%.

cs.CR