How Withheld Punishment Enables Authoritarian Persistence: An Evolutionary Dynamics Approach

Abstract

Democratic backsliding is often framed as a contest between pro-democratic defenders and anti-institutional norm-breakers. That framing can miss a third behavior, a public that withholds punishment from norm-breakers while penalizing those who confront them. We study a minimal three-strategy evolutionary game, with institutional defenders, anti-institutional disruptors, and this non-punishing public evolving under replicator dynamics. We grant defenders a head-to-head advantage over disruptors and ask whether it guarantees their long-run success. It does not. Two payoff regimes, differing only in how the public and disruptors interact, produce two failure modes. In an exploitation regime, the public is harmed by disruptors yet withholds sanction, so the three strategies exhibit cyclic dominance. When the losses around the cycle outweigh the gains, every interior trajectory approaches a boundary heteroclinic cycle in which disruptors repeatedly resurge. In an accommodation regime, the public and disruptors each gain from their interaction. When the public's gain is large enough, every interior trajectory converges to a stable public-disruptor coalition that excludes defenders. A pro-democratic advantage is therefore not enough. Weak sanction and penalized confrontation can leave anti-institutional disruption recurring or entrenched.