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arXiv · 2601.05417

Mean Field Analysis of Blockchain Systems

Yanni Georghiades·Takashi Tanaka·Sriram Vishwanath
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Abstract

We present a novel framework for analyzing blockchain consensus mechanisms by modeling blockchain growth as a Partially Observable Stochastic Game (POSG) which we reduce to a set of Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs) through the use of the mean field approximation. This approach formalizes the decision-making process of miners in Proof-of-Work (PoW) systems and enables a principled examination of block selection strategies as well as steady state analysis of the induced Markov chain. By leveraging a mean field game formulation, we efficiently characterize the information asymmetries that arise in asynchronous blockchain networks. Our first main result is an exact characterization of the tradeoff between network delay and PoW efficiency--the fraction of blocks which end up in the longest chain. We demonstrate that the tradeoff observed in our model at steady state aligns closely with theoretical findings, validating our use of the mean field approximation. Our second main result is a rigorous equilibrium analysis of the Longest Chain Rule (LCR). We show that the LCR is a mean field equilibrium and that it is uniquely optimal in maximizing PoW efficiency under certain mild assumptions. This result provides the first formal justification for continued use of the LCR in decentralized consensus protocols, offering both theoretical validation and practical insights. Beyond these core results, our framework supports flexible experimentation with alternative block selection strategies, system dynamics, and reward structures. It offers a systematic and scalable substitute for expensive test-net deployments or ad hoc analysis. While our primary focus is on Nakamoto-style blockchains, the model is general enough to accommodate other architectures through modifications to the underlying MDP.

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Yanni Georghiades, Takashi Tanaka, Sriram Vishwanath. 2026-01-08. Mean Field Analysis of Blockchain Systems. https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.05417

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